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This paper studies the relationship between official announcements and the effectiveness 
of foreign exchange interventions in a noisy rational expectations equilibrium model. We 
show that when heterogeneously informed traders have inaccurate information, an 
exchange rate is likely to be misaligned from its fundamental value in the presence of 
noise trades. Then the central bank uses the disclosure of public information to improve 
the accuracy of private agents’ information and encourage risk-arbitrage thereby 
enhancing the informativeness of the exchange rate. This effect holds, even when the 
central bank does not possess superior information to traders, as long as public 
information is not perfectly correlated with the information of traders. We provide 
evidence that announced interventions are more effective in periods of high implied 
volatility, consistent with the theoretical prediction that the implied volatility of the 
exchange rate is positively correlated with the information inaccuracy of traders and the 
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1.  Introduction 
There is a rapidly growing literature on the role of communication for monetary 
authorities managing market expectations in foreign exchange markets.
1 This new trend reflects 
the fact that major central banks such as the Fed and the ECB have become reluctant to intervene 
and have shifted toward the use of communication policy in the management of their exchange 
rates. The Bank of Japan still continues to intervene in the market, albeit with a lower frequency 
than before, but also puts serious effort into communication and transparency concerning its 
exchange rate policy.
2 Despite this shift towards communication policy, a consensus has not been 
reached among researchers on how official announcements as well as actual interventions 
influence exchange rate movements. 
The portfolio-balance channel and the signaling channel are two traditional channels 
through which sterilized interventions can affect exchange rates. In the portfolio-balance channel, 
interventions change the composition of portfolios and thus the risk premium due to imperfect 
substitutability of the underlying assets (Dominguez and Frankel, 1993). The small scale of 
interventions relative to the large volume of transactions in foreign exchange markets and the 
huge value of stocks of international assets has led researchers to emphasize the signaling 
hypothesis, by which actual and announced interventions may be perceived by markets as 
indicating future monetary policy or developments of other policy measures (Mussa, 1981). 
Lewis (1995), Kaminsky and Lewis (1996) and Fatum and Hutchison (1999) find, however, that 
U.S. interventions have not conveyed a clear signal about future monetary policy. 
The following theoretical models therefore explore the intervention channels under which 
central banks do not possess superior private information to market participants or influence the 
fundamental value of the exchange rate.
3 Among these, the coordination channel was first 
advocated by Sarno and Taylor (2001) and formulated by Reitz and Taylor (2008). If the strong 
and persistent misalignments of exchange rates are caused by non-fundamental influences, such 
that a return to equilibrium is hampered by a coordination failure among fundamental-based 
traders, then official intervention may act as a coordinating signal, encouraging speculators to 
 
1 Examples include Beine and Bernal (2007), Beine et al. (2009a, 2009b), Dominguez and Panthaki 
(2007), Fratzscher (2006, 2008, 2009), Gnabo and Teiletche (2009), Gnabo et al. (2009), and Jansen 
and De Haan (2005, 2007). 
2 The criticism over currency manipulation is one reason that Japan hesitates to make frequent 
interventions. After a six-year moratorium, the Bank of Japan has recently intervened in currency 
markets three times: on Sep 15, 2010, March 18, 2011 and August 4, 2011. 
3  Bhattacharya and Weller (1997), Vitale (1999), and Ferre and Manzano (2009) consider the secrecy 
puzzle with models in which the central bank knows perfectly the fundamental value of the exchange 
rate or infers it from the market rate.  3 
 
re-enter the market and at the same time returning the exchange rate to a level consistent with 
economic fundamentals. 
Closely related to the coordination channel is the information sharing channel proposed 
by Popper and Montgomery (2001). Under this channel, even if the central bank has no 
information about fundamentals, it can affect the exchange rate by aggregating and disseminating 
some traders’ information about transitory exchange rate disturbances because the sharing of 
information makes the exchange rate less noisy and allows all market participants to extract a 
better signal of fundamentals from the exchange rate.   
A drawback of the coordination channel is that it does not model how the central bank 
acquires information about the fundamental value of the exchange rate, which is relevant in 
deciding the time and magnitude of interventions. On the other hand, the information sharing 
channel assumes that the central bank frequently gathers information about market conditions 
from bank dealers, which enables it to infer the fundamental value. However, the assumption that 
the central bank can distinguish between price-informed dealers and uninformed dealers is too 
strong as it is extremely difficult to discern dealer type in reality.   
In this paper, we provide an alternative channel to the above two theories, which 
highlights that the (even inaccurate) information endowed to and signaled by the central bank 
enables traders to improve their information accuracy. This information improving channel is 
introduced by incorporating intervention operations into the noisy rational expectations 
equilibrium models of Hellwig (1980) and Diamond and Verrecchia (1981). When informed 
traders have inaccurate information about fundamental values, an exchange rate is likely to be 
misaligned from its fundamental value and exhibit high implied volatility in the presence of noise 
trades. In this circumstance, we assume that the central bank intervenes in the market by 
disclosing its own signal about the fundamental value or, equivalently, announcing the target 
level of the future exchange rate. The announcement of the central bank improves the accuracy of 
traders’ information and therefore helps them to engage in risk-arbitrage effectively. As a result, 
the exchange rate moves towards the fundamental value and becomes less noisy. 
It should be stressed that this channel functions even when the central bank does not 
possess superior information to private agents. In the model, the equilibrium exchange rate does 
not fully reveal all the information available in the market due to the existence of noise trades. In 
other words, the market is informationally inefficient. Although informed traders’ risk-arbitrage 
is profitable at the expense of noise traders, the arbitrage is limited because the informed traders 
are risk averse. We show that the more accurate information the informed traders have, the more  4 
 
                                                
effectively they engage in risk-arbitrage and the more informational efficient the market becomes. 
Accordingly, the public signal from the central bank has informational value that affects the 
exchange rate, as long as traders’ private signals are not perfectly correlated with the public 
signal. 
Our model has several noteworthy features. First, unlike the coordination channel or the 
information sharing channel, our channel is not driven by the homogenization of traders’ 
forecasts of the future exchange rate, but by an increase in the accuracy of their information about 
the fundamental value.
4,5 Even in our model, both the accuracy improvement of traders’ 
information and the homogenization of their forecasts can be achieved simultaneously by central 
bank announcements. However, the latter is not a necessary condition for diminishing exchange 
rate misalignments. To address the difference between the mechanism in our model and the 
mechanisms in the coordination channel and the information sharing channel, we show that the 
relationship between the accuracy improvement of traders’ private information and the 
homogenization of their forecasts is nonlinear and that there is a case where worsening informed 
traders’ private information could homogenize their forecasts. This is due to the fact that if the 
private information worsens, the informed traders are likely to rely more on their public signal 
(i.e., the exchange rate) and less on their private signal which includes an independent error term 
about the fundamental value across the traders. This will lead to the homogeneity of traders’ 
forecasts. 
Second, this model shows that the degree of information inaccuracy of informed traders 
about the fundamental value of the exchange rate, which is the key variable in the model, is 
positively linked to the implied volatility of the exchange rate. This implies that the information 
improving channel is more effective in an environment of high implied volatility or, in other 
words, large market uncertainty because this is when information inaccuracy causes the exchange 
rate to be significantly misaligned. Fratzscher (2008) provides consistent evidence that announced 
interventions are more likely to be successful if exchange rate volatility is high, i.e. above its 
median value, in the previous two weeks. Our theoretical prediction that implied volatility can be 
 
4 Specifically, Reitz and Taylor (2008) propose a mechanism under which announced and actual 
interventions influence informed traders’ confidence in fundamental analysis and coordinate their 
risk-arbitrage behavior. On the other hand, Popper and Montgomery (2001) assume that the central 
bank can transmit information to the market about average customer orders originating from a group 
of traders who have no information about the future exchange rate. In both channels, official 
interventions make traders’ forecasts about the future exchange rate less heterogeneous. 
5  Reitz et al. (2010) and Beine et al. (2007) provide empirical evidence on the impact of interventions 
on exchange rate forecast heterogeneity.  5 
 
used as a proxy for traders’ information inaccuracy allows us to easily detect an exchange rate 
misalignment and provides us with a tractable measure for deciding the timing of FX 
interventions. We present evidence that official announcements are more effective when 
accompanied interventions take place in high implied volatility periods. 
We exploit changes in Japanese intervention policy to empirically test the theoretical 
predictions of our model. Japanese intervention policy changes frequently with regard to 
announcements in accordance with who is in charge of foreign exchange interventions at the 
Ministry of Finance. In addition, Japanese intervention strategy in terms of volume and frequency 
has not been consistent across the interveners. These uncommon features of Japanese 
interventions allow us to investigate the effect of official announcements, controlling for volume 
effects. 
Our paper highlights the importance of market conditions for effective interventions. 
Although many studies investigate the effects of intervention strategies such as announced and 
secret interventions (Dominguez, 1998, 2003a; Beine et al., 2007, 2009a), few studies examine 
whether their effectiveness depends on market conditions (Fratzscher, 2006; Dominguez, 2003b). 
This paper provides empirical results that announcements have a more significant influence on 
the level and reduce the implied volatility of the exchange rate when the implied volatility on the 
previous trading day is high. This is consistent with the information improving channel we 
propose in this study. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 demonstrates the 
theoretical model of actual and announced interventions in foreign exchange markets. Section 3 
describes the intervention data and the sampling scheme. Section 4 explains the empirical 
methodology and Section 5 presents the estimation results. Section 6 contains our conclusions. 
 
2. Theory 
In this section, we present a noisy rational expectations equilibrium model with central 
bank’s intervention operations. First, we study how the information accuracy of traders relates to 
the distribution of exchange rate misalignments, the implied volatility, and heterogeneity in 
investors' forecasts. We then specify the central bank's intervention decision rules to examine the 
effect of official announcements on the effectiveness of interventions through improvements in 
the information accuracy of traders.   
 
2.1. Assumptions Consider a pure exchange economy with three trading periods and two assets, one 
riskless domestic currency (with a constant price equal to one) and one risky foreign currency. 
The future value of the foreign currency is denoted y in terms of domestic currency, where y is 
normally distributed with mean  y  and  variance  σy
2, and it is revealed in period 3. In period 1 all 
traders choose net demand for the foreign currency and its price, denoted p, is determined in the 
market. The traders who trade in period 1 receive their payoff of y per unit in period 3 when y 
becomes public. We call p and y as the exchange rate of the foreign currency in periods 1 and 3, 
respectively. In period 2 the central bank decides whether to intervene in the foreign exchange 
market. 
We assume that there are n identical informed traders indexed by i =1,..., n. Trader i 
receives a signal,   
(1)  si = y + εi 
in period 1 about the future value of the foreign currency. The error terms, ε1, ε2,..., εn are drawn 
independently from an identical normal distribution with mean 0 and variance σε
2. All traders 
receive their signals before trade begins. These informed traders have CARA utility with a 
common coefficient of risk aversion a > 0 and maximize expected utility, which is a function of 
wealth denoted in home currency. 
Apart from trades by informed traders, there are noise trades reflecting the demand and 
supply for the foreign currency from foreign traders, travelers, and naive arbitragers with biased 
belief. We denote the per-capita net demand of noise trades as x, which is assumed to be 
independently normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σx
2. The random variables, y, x, ε1, 
ε2,..., εn, are independent and the informed traders know their distributions. 
Under the assumption of CARA utility, it is known that the optimal demand does not 
depend on traders' initial wealth. Hence we focus on capital gains, (y − p) zi, where zi is the 
quantity of the foreign currency that trader i purchases in period 1. Trader i's maximization 
problem is simplified as follows: 
max exp[ ( ) ] , .
i
ii z Ea y p z s ⎡⎤ −− − ⎣⎦ p   (2) 
Informed traders know that the demands of other informed traders affect the equilibrium 
price of the foreign currency and make rational inferences about underlying information from the 
price. To learn from the price, these traders must conjecture a form for the price function, and in 
equilibrium this conjecture must be correct. Suppose that the traders conjecture the following 











  (3) 
where β0, βs, and βx are coefficients to be determined. Under this conjecture, we can apply the 
projection theorem
6 which assures that the distribution of y conditional on (si, p) is normal. Under 
this CARA-Gaussian setting, we can easily derive investor i's demand function for the foreign 
currency: 
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2.2. Equilibrium exchange rate function 
In equilibrium, the total net demand for the foreign currency must equal zero. 
(5)    0 ) , (
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We find the equilibrium by solving equation (5) for p and then verifying that p is of the 
form conjectured in (3). Our assumption of homogeneous traders allows us to obtain a closed 
form solution. Though we have a closed form solution of the model, its complicated form does 
not provide for a study of equilibrium properties. In addition, the model with finite traders 
contains a theoretical contradiction. Hellwig (1980) describes it as "schizophrenic," which means 
that traders behave as price takers although each trader can affect the equilibrium price when 
traders are finite. To solve this contradiction, we follow Hellwig and study the limit case with 
infinite traders. In our setting, his result becomes as follows. 
 
PROPOSITION 1: As n goes infinity, the equilibrium price converges almost surely to   
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Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
This proposition means that, by the strong law of large numbers, the error terms of 
private signals are canceled out and do not affect the equilibrium price. From now on, we study 
the property of this limit case equilibrium as a description of the foreign exchange market. We 
use the mean and variance conditional on (si, p) in the equilibrium in order to derive results from 
a comparative statics analysis in the next section: 
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6  For a general version of the projection theorem, see Brunnermeier (2001, p.12). ) ( ) ( ] , | [ y p y s y p s y E p i s i − ⋅ + − ⋅ + = α α ,  (7) 
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 An important property of this model is informational inefficiency; the equilibrium 
exchange rate does not reflect all the available information in the market because of noise trades x. 
Following this convention, let us define the fundamental value of the foreign currency as its value 
estimated from all information available in the market. Noise trades make it impossible for 
informed traders to infer the fundamental value from the exchange rate. Note that the 
fundamental value is equivalent to the future value y in the limit case with infinite traders because 
the infinite private signals and the strong law of large numbers enable us to obtain a perfect 
estimate of the future value. In contrast, if there is no noise trade as in the model of Grossman 
(1976), informed traders can infer the fundamental value from the current exchange rate. We can 
verify from proposition 1 that, when σx
2=0, the equilibrium exchange rate is equal to the 
fundamental value y. Based on this understanding, in the rest of the paper, we define a bubble in 
the exchange rate as p − y, the misalignment of the current exchange rate from its fundamental 
value. We can measure the informativeness of the exchange rate by the variance of the bubble; 
the degree of informativeness increases as var[p - y] decreases. 
We show in a later section that, due to informational inefficiency, additional information 
provided by the central bank can affect the equilibrium exchange rate. Although additional 
information does not change the fundamental value of the foreign currency in the limit case, it 
enables informed traders to make more precise estimates of y (the smaller conditional variance of 
y) and therefore to have a larger position as indicated by equation (4). As a result of informed 
traders’ active trades, the exchange rate shifts toward the fundamental value y.  
 
2.3. Comparative statics with respect to signal accuracy 
 
In this section, we analyze how traders’ information accuracy has an influence on the 
distribution of the bubble, implied volatility and the heterogeneity of forecasts in the foreign 
exchange market before the central bank intervenes in the market. We show that less accurate 
information reduces the informativeness of the exchange rate and increases implied volatility, 
while the effect on the heterogeneity of traders’ forecasts is ambiguous.  
A. Distribution of the bubble 
We first study the effect of σε
2 on the distribution of the bubble. Since p is a linear 
function of normal random variables and y is also normal, p − y is normally distributed. The price 
function (6) implies that the mean is zero, and the variance is 
(9)  . 
2 2 * 2 2 *) 1 ( ] var[ x x y s y p σ β σ β + − = −
 
Then we can show that 




(10)  . 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
The positive sign implies that when traders have more accurate signal (smaller σε
2), the 
exchange rate p in period 1 distributes closer to the fundamental value y. The reason is that when 
the private signal is accurate, informed traders' risk-arbitrage becomes more effective. Such 
risk-arbitrage leads the exchange rate to distribute closer to its fundamental value and enhance the 
informativeness of the exchange rate. Conversely, when private information is less accurate, the 
exchange rate is likely to be disturbed more by noise trades and thus is noisier in period 1. 
Although the parameter σε
2 is unobservable, the following market variables are supposed 
to be used as proxies for it: implied volatility and the heterogeneity of traders' forecasts. We 
investigate the relationship between σε
2 and these two variables analytically. 
 
B. Implied volatility 
Implied volatility is a concept developed in the study of option pricing. Under some 
assumptions, the equilibrium price for a call option is a monotone function of the volatility of 
underlying asset returns. This volatility is, by definition, subjectively expected by investors in the 
market, and thus unobservable. If the market works as the theory assumes, however, we can infer 
volatility from the observed call price in the market by using the inverse function of the call 
option price function. 
In our model, volatility corresponds to the conditional variance of y on each trader's 
information,  . The effect of σε
2 on implied volatility is given by  ] , | var[ p s y i
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 This expression is consistent with intuition. When private signals are less accurate, the 
public signal (in this case, p) is also less accurate, and the conditional variance of y is therefore 
larger. The strictly positive sign for (11) allows us to regard implied volatility as a proxy for σε
2. 
 
C. Heterogeneity of forecasts 
As traders have dispersed private information, their conditional expectations for y on 
their information are also dispersed. One may presume that less accurate information leads to 
heterogeneity of forecasts among traders. This is correct if we define trader i's forecasts as equal 
to their private information si. However, the trader’s forecasts should be defined as the 
expectation based on both their private information and all available information including public 
information. If the heterogeneity of traders' forecasts is defined this way, it is not always a good 
proxy for σε
2. 
Suppose we take a sample of M traders. The heterogeneity of forecasts, denoted H, is 
given by the following statistics: 
2
11
1 ] , | [
1
] , | [
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Putting (7) into (12), we have 
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When M is sufficiently large, this statistics distributes near the mean 
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PROPOSITION 2 
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σε .  (16) 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
This proposition assures that, as long as the error term is less volatile than the 
fundamental value of the exchange rate, the heterogeneity of forecasts is increasing with σε
2. 
However, this proposition does not hold when traders' private signals are too inaccurate to rely on. 
 10 
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In this case, private signals do not influence their posterior beliefs significantly. Since all traders 
have common prior beliefs in our model, traders' forecasts {E[y|si, p]}i stay closer to the common 
unconditional expectation E[y]= μ and thus the difference in forecasts is decreasing with σε
2. This 
nonlinear relationship between the heterogeneity of forecasts and the measure of information 
inaccuracy is important for differentiating the mechanism of official interventions in our model 
from those of the coordination channel and the information sharing channel. 
 
2.4. Intervention by the central bank 
To complete our theoretical argument, we allow the central bank to intervene in the 
foreign exchange market if necessary in period 2. For simplicity, we deal with official 
interventions as if they are unexpected events for informed traders. If we relax this assumption 
and allow for dynamic interaction between the central bank and traders, the model becomes too 
complicated to analyze. However, we do not regard this assumption as critical for our results. 
Note that interventions support the risk-arbitrage of informed traders, instead of ruining it. 
Basically, informed traders buy under-priced foreign currency and sell over-priced foreign 
currency because they know the exchange rate turns out to be the true value of the currency in 
period 3. If traders follow such an investment style, they can get an advanced cash flow in period 
2 thanks to the intervention by the central bank, which attempts to push the exchange rate toward 
the true value based on its information in period 2. Thus, we believe that traders' behavior is not 
affected significantly by interventions, even if they are expected.   
We assume that the central bank also receives imperfect information through the 
following signal: 
(17)  sB = y +εB.  
The error term εB has an independent normal distribution with mean 0 and variance θσε
2, 
where θ is a strictly positive constant and represents the accuracy level of the central bank's 
information relative to informed traders. For example, θ smaller than 1 implies the central bank 
has more accurate information than traders. Note that when σε
2 is large, both informed traders and 
the central bank have less accurate information. In other words, we assume that when it is 
difficult for informed traders to predict the true future value of the foreign currency, it is also 
difficult for the central bank. We also assume that the distributions of random variables (y, x, ε) 
and the constant term θ  are common knowledge among traders and the central bank and that the 
rational central bank knows the objective function of informed traders.   Using this private information and the exchange rate p observed in period 1, the central 
bank follows the following simple statistical decision rule. 
 
7 INTERVENTION RULE : For a given probability π in (0, 1), if P[y > p|sB, p] > π, or if 
P[y < p|sB, p] > π, then the central bank intervenes in the foreign exchange market to move the 
current exchange rate toward E[y|sB, p]. π is set to a high value close to 1 in order to avoid a 
government failure. 
 
This rule implies that the central bank intervenes in the foreign exchange market to move 
the exchange rate toward the fundamental value when it judges statistically that there is a bubble. 
Statistically speaking, interventions take place when a null hypothesis of no bubble is rejected 
with significance level 1 − π. Parameter π represents how prudent the central bank is. Because the 
central bank has imperfect information, and thus the intervention can make the bubble bigger 
based on information with a serious error. This is why the prudent parameter π should be set 
sufficiently high. 
The conditional distribution of y − p based on the central bank's information (sB, p) is 
normal with mean E[y|sB, p] − p, and variance var[y|sB, p]. Therefore, the intervention condition is 
replaced by 
] , | var[ ] , | [ p s y Z p p s y E B B π > − (18)  . 
Zπ is the solution for Φ(Z) =π, where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard 
normal distribution. The left hand side of inequality (18) represents the bubble subjectively 
recognized by the central bank. The right hand side is constant. That is, the central bank 
intervenes when the expected bubble is larger than a critical value. The expected bubble can be 
decomposed in the following manner: 
) ( ) ] , | [ ( ] , | [ p y y p s y E p p s y E B B − + − = −   (19) 
This decomposition indicates that the expected bubble is comprised of the true bubble y 
− p, and the central bank's estimation error mainly due to εB. Needless to say, the aim of the 
intervention is to clear the true bubble. Although it is impossible for the central bank to 
discriminate between the true bubble and the estimation error, the central bank can clear the 
subjectively recognized bubble. 
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7  The spirit of this decision rule is analogous to the statistical decision-making of manufacturers when 
testing whether their products satisfy quality requirements. See Shewhart (1931)’s quality control 
chart.  13 
 
                                                
Under this model setting, the central bank has two intervention measures: actual 
intervention and official announcement. To examine the effect of interventions, we need to 
specify traders' information and their reaction to interventions. We assume that interventions are 
unexpected events and therefore traders only realize that an intervention has occurred and update 
their posterior beliefs when the central bank makes an announcement. Actual interventions 
without any announcement are assumed to be unobservable like noise trades, and thus traders 
cannot update their posterior beliefs. We also assume that, when the central bank announces, 
informed traders know the distribution of the central bank's signal. That is, they know that the 
central bank also has imperfect information and that the error term is independent of their own 
private signals. Using this information they make rational inferences about y based on the 
announcement, and modify their demand function for the foreign currency in Period 2. 
 
A. Actual interventions 
The central bank can move the exchange rate toward the subjective fundamental value, 
E[y|sB, p], by trading the foreign currency in a manner that cancels the noise trade x. Note that the 
demand curve for the foreign currency is downward sloping when the market is informationally 
inefficient. Therefore, any trade can affect the exchange rate along the demand curve.
8 The 
required trade for this purpose is (E[y|sB,p] −p)/ βx
*. If the interventions are too costly due to low 
foreign reserves or a high borrowing cost, the exchange rate will not reach the target. 
 
B. Official announcements 
Under informational inefficiency, the central bank can affect the exchange rate by 
providing additional information to informed traders, which stimulates their risk-arbitrage. To see 
the pure effect of official announcements, suppose that the central bank announce sB publicly but 
does not engage in any market operations. Note that, as long as the informed traders know that 
the central bank is also rational, announcing a signal sB and the central bank's target E[y|sB, p] are 
equivalent because the conditional expectation of y is a one-to-one function of sB given the public 
signal p.  
Let p' be the equilibrium exchange rate after the official announcement of sB, which can 
be represented as 
 
8 We assume that traders would not recognize interventions without official announcements. This 
means that traders suppose the change in the exchange rate is caused by a change in the noise trade, 
not by an intervention, and modify their demand for the foreign currency along the demand function 
(4).  x y y y p x B B y γ ε γ γ + + − + = ′ ) ( .  (20) 
The modified exchange rate is affected by the central bank's information error, εB. As this 
function is too complicated to derive a closed form solution for coefficients γ’s we analyze it 
numerically and obtain the following results.   
First, the post-announcement implied volatility decreases to var[y| si, sB, p], which is 
always strictly lower than pre-announcement implied volatility var[y| si, p] for any finite θ. 
9 The 
additional information through announced interventions makes traders' information more accurate 
as the error term εB is independent of private investors’ information error εi.  
Second, on average, the announcement successfully diminishes the “true bubble” with the 
help of active risk-arbitrage. As the demand function (4) demonstrates, lower implied volatility 
allows traders to bet larger positions based on their information. In other words, official 
announcements make risk-arbitrage by informed traders more active and effective than before. 
Figure 1 shows the effect of an announcement on the variance of the bubble (the reciprocal of the 
informativeness of the exchange rate). The graph is drawn for a set of parameters. The 
announcement has a larger effect for smaller θ when the central bank has more accurate 
information than informed traders. When θ is quite large, the announcement has little effect. 
Since informed traders are rational and know θ, an unreliable announcement is simply ignored 
and does not harm the market. In the middle range, the effect depends on parameters. For 
reasonable parameters, a central bank with the same accuracy level as traders (i.e. θ = 1) can 
diminish the variance of the bubble to roughly half of its initial size. Note that the above results 
represent an average effect. We cannot exclude the case where the announcement may 
unintentionally increase the bubble when the central bank receives an unusually bad signal εB. 
This happens with a low probability, however, as the central bank is too cautious to intervene in 
the market when the variance of the signal is large. 
Third, the post-announcement forecasts of traders (E[y|si,sB,p]) distribute closer to each 
other than pre-announcement forecasts (E[y|si,p]). Figure 2 presents the effect of an 
announcement on the heterogeneity of forecasts. As explained in Section 2.3 C, pre-announced 
heterogeneity has an inverse-U shaped relationship with information inaccuracy. Heterogeneity 
increases until σε
2 reaches a threshold level (in this case, σε
2 = 7.1) and decreases thereafter. 
When the central bank announces its public signal, traders’ forecasts homogenize regardless of 
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9 In  equilibrium,  p' is a linear combination of sB and p (See Appendix D). This implies that var[y| si, sB, 
p, p'] equals var[y| si, sB, p]. In addition, since sB has an independent error term, we have var[y| si, sB, 
p] < var[y| si, p].  15 
 
the value of θ because the public signal is common for all traders and they utilized the 
information to form their expectations. Obviously, the degree of homogenization caused by an 
announcement depends on θ. When it is quite small, the announcement has a large effect on the 
homogenization of forecasts.   
 
C. Actual interventions and official announcements 
What if the central bank implements actual interventions and official announcements 
simultaneously? The answer depends critically on the credibility of the central bank's market 
operation. If traders believe that the central bank can achieve the target of its market operation 
after the announcement, then it is rational for traders to buy (sell) the foreign currency as much as 
possible when the price is lower (higher) than the target price because such arbitrage is riskless 
given the belief. This riskless arbitrage causes the exchange rate to reach the target before the 
central bank conducts the actual interventions. A situation that will occur even if the required 
interventions are too costly for the central bank to achieve by itself, as long as traders believe it 
has enough reserves. In contrast, if traders believe that the central bank does not have enough 
reserves, then the exchange rate moves to p', but will not reach the target E[y|sB, p] without the 
central bank's actual interventions. In fact, this situation is like a coordination game in which 
traders' beliefs are self-fulfilling. Credible monetary authorities can achieve the target without 
actual interventions by winning the traders over to their side. 
 
2.5. Hypotheses derived from the model 
Our model provides several theoretical predictions on the foreign exchange market and 
the effectiveness of interventions. First, in the presence of noise trades, an exchange rate is likely 
to be more misaligned from its fundamental value and exhibit a higher implied volatility when 
informed traders have less accurate information. Second, under plausible assumptions, the degree 
of information inaccuracy about the fundamental value and the implied volatility of an exchange 
rate are positively correlated. Hence, implied volatility can be used as a policy tool to determine 
the timing and magnitude of interventions, as the impact of interventions is greater when implied 
volatility is higher. Third, official announcements can make the exchange rate less noisy (i.e. 
increase the informativeness) and reduce both implied volatility and the heterogeneity of forecasts 
because they contribute to the improvement of traders’ information accuracy. This holds even 
when the central bank does not possess superior information to that of traders.    16 
 
                                                
These predictions provide the following testable hypotheses: First, official 
announcements and actual interventions have a more significant impact on the level of the 
exchange rate when the implied volatility of the exchange rate is high. Second, if they are 
conducted in a timely manner, the implied volatility of the exchange rate and the heterogeneity of 
forecasts are reduced. 
Reitz et al. (2010) provide empirical evidence that central bank interventions reduce 
forecast dispersion, which is consistent with the coordination channel and the information sharing 
channel as well as our theory. To highlight the aspects of our theory that differ from the previous 
two channels, we leave heterogeneity in forecasts and empirically test whether high implied 
volatility of the exchange rate is a pre-condition for effective interventions and announcements 
using Japanese and US intervention data.   
 
3.    Data and Japanese intervention policy changes 
To address the announcement effect, we classify interventions into three categories using 
news reports provided by Bloomberg: announced interventions, unannounced but reported 
interventions, and secret interventions.
10 ‘Announced interventions’ are those accompanied by 
official statements from government officials on the intervention day. The government officials 
may include the Minister of Finance, the Vice Minister of Finance for International Affairs, the 
Director General of the International Bureau and the Governor of the BOJ. They often confirm 
interventions by publicly stating that the BOJ intervened in the market.
 Then the statements are 
broadcast along with the name of the official making the announcement within a few minutes by 
newswires. ‘Unannounced but reported interventions’ are reported by newswires but without any 
corresponding official statements. Newswire reports sometimes quote traders as saying, “[s]ome 
traders said that the BOJ intervened in the market at around 115 yen during the morning session” 
or “[t]he BOJ apparently bought dollars against yen.” On the other hand, ‘secret interventions’ are 
not reported by the newswires, but do actually take place. 
It is well known that the Japanese intervention policy changed in June 1995 when Eisuke 
Sakakibara took over as Director General of the International Finance Bureau. He made a 
deliberate decision to reduce the frequency and increase the volume of interventions (Sakakibara, 
2002).
11 Accordingly, some studies on Japanese interventions divide their sample periods into pre 
and post June 1995 (Ito, 2003; Beine et al., 2009b). Intervention policy also changed after his 
 
10  We double-checked the classification of interventions using Reuters. 
11  Dr. Sakakibara became famous in the market after being nicknamed “Mr. Yen” by the NY Times 
(Sep 16, 1995).  17 
 
                                                
resignation, especially in terms of making official announcements about interventions. Hence, we 
divide our sample period into four sub-periods according to who is the Vice Minister of Finance 
for International Affairs of the MOF at the time, as he has the most influence on Japanese 
intervention decisions.
12 The sub-sample periods are period 1 (6/15/1992 - 6/20/1995), period 2 
(6/21/1995 - 7/7/1999), period 3 (7/8/1999 - 1/13/2003) and period 4 (1/14/2003 - 5/27/2004). 
Intervention techniques are quite different depending on the person who actually decides. Figure 
3 illustrates the movement of the yen/dollar rates and intervention volume during the full sample 
period. 
Table 1 displays the average volume and intervention types for the whole sample period 
and the four sub-periods from May 13, 1991 to July 2, 2004. During the sample period, there are 
343 intervention days for the yen/dollar rate (10.1% of the sample). Among the intervention days, 
208 (60.6%) are correctly reported by newswires, while 135 (39.6%) are not reported but have 
actually taken place (secret interventions). 12.8% of the intervention days are announced by 
government officials (announced interventions) and 47.8% are not announced but are reported by 
newswires (unannounced interventions). 
Period 1 is characterized by frequent, small interventions. In this period, frequency is the 
highest among the four sub-periods (averaging an intervention every 4.77 days) and the average 
volume of an intervention was 47 billion yen, which is the smallest among the four sub-periods. 
There are 18 days of coordinated interventions with the Federal Reserve Bank of NY in period 1. 
During period 1, only 6.1% of interventions are announced, while more than 70% are 
unannounced but reported interventions. 
In period 2, when Dr. Sakakibara was in charge of interventions, he reduced the 
intervention frequency (averaging 39.83 days between interventions), while increasing the 
average size of interventions (510 billion yen per day). The ratio of both ‘officially announced’ 
and ‘unannounced but reported’ interventions was high (91.6%). In addition, half of the 
announced interventions in period 2 were accompanied by Federal Reserve Bank of NY 
interventions.  
In period 3 the trend of infrequent but large interventions continued. There were only 25 
intervention days (averaging 36.72 days per intervention) and the average volume of an 
 
12  The MOF determines the volume and timing of interventions and the BOJ, which receives the order 
from the MOF, executes the intervention in the foreign exchange market. The decision makers for 
intervention are limited to the Minister of Finance, the Vice Minister and Deputy Vice Minister of 
Finance for International Affairs, the Director General of the International Bureau and the Director of 
the foreign Exchange Market Division. (Sakakibara, 2002)   intervention was approximately 530 billion yen, which is the largest among the four sub-periods. 
It is remarkable that all of the interventions in period 3 were announced. 
In period 4 the intervention policy changed dramatically from infrequent and large to 
frequent and medium-sized. The frequency of interventions in period 4 increased to an average of 
one intervention every 2.78 business days. Another big change was the very high ratio of secret 
interventions, which made up 74.4% of all interventions in this period. After Mr. Mizoguchi was 
appointed as Vice Minister of Finance for International Affairs, government officials declined to 
make comments or give any interviews. Instead of announcing interventions as they occurred, the 
MOF started to reveal the monthly volume of interventions at the end of each month and the 
volume of the interventions every three months. In response to the change in the intervention 
strategy, newswire reports turned to vague statements such as “market participants are keeping 
watch for a possible intervention” and “[t]he BOJ seemed to be active in the market.” 
 
4.  Empirical  methodology 
In the empirical sections, we test our hypothesis that official announcements and actual 
interventions are more effective when the implied volatility of an exchange rate is higher. We 
would expect that the level of the exchange rate will move in the desired direction and the 
implied volatility of the exchange rate will be reduced if they are conducted in a timely manner. 
This hypothesis can be tested using the GARCH model and the OLS model using implied 
volatilities extracted from option prices. The former examines the impact of interventions on the 
level and the ex-post volatility of an exchange rate, while the latter on the ex-ante volatility 
representing investors’ expected future volatility. Following Beine et al. (2009a) and Dominguez 
(1998), the GARCH (1, 1) model of the yen-dollar exchange rate has the following specification: 
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where   is the logarithmic return of the spot exchange rate (expressed as a 
percentage) with   as the yen/dollar rate (NY close).   denotes a vector of independent 
variables related to the Japanese and U.S. interventions as well as macro variables that may affect 
exchange rates. 
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Three dummies are considered in the estimation equations for announced interventions, 
unannounced but reported interventions and secret interventions for Japan and the U.S. These 
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 13 dummies are independent of intervention volume by both countries,  and take a value of +1 if 
such an intervention strategy is carried out for dollar purchases (yen sales), -1 for yen purchases 
(dollar sales) and zero otherwise. The intervention volume variable is also signed with + (dollar 
purchases) and – (yen purchases). If dollar purchase interventions by the U.S. and Japanese 
monetary authorities tend to cause the dollar to appreciate and the yen to depreciate, the 
coefficients are expected to be positive. As suggested by Dominguez (1998), we also include the 
interest rate differential between the Japanese and U.S. overnight money market rates in the level 
equation in order to account for relative contemporaneous monetary policies in both countries.
14 
We include a holiday dummy in the volatility equation which takes a value of 1 if the previous 
day is a holiday and 0 otherwise. All variables in the volatility equation are taken to be the 
absolute values of those in the mean equation. 
Following Bonser-Neal and Tanner (1996) and Dominguez (1998), the effects of official 
announcements and actual interventions on the implied volatility of the exchange rate are tested 
using the following specification: 
t t t t Z b Y a iv ε + + = −1 ' ' (22)       
where   is the logarithmic return of implied volatility (expressed as a 
percentage) with   the implied volatility estimate derived from at-the-money option prices 
(one- and three-month) on the spot yen/dollar rates from the NY market (10 AM EST). The 
variables concerning the Japanese interventions and macro variables are included in  . On the 
other hand, following Dominguez (1998), the variables related to the Fed’s intervention are 
lagged by one day, which are included in  , because market participants do not know (with 
certainty) the Fed’s Tuesday interventions on Tuesday morning. Since variables related to 
interventions are all taken as absolute values, we expect negative signs for the coefficients if 
interventions are effective in reducing implied volatility. 
) / ln( 100 1 − = t t t IV IV iv
t IV
t Y
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13 Existing empirical research testing the signaling hypothesis using news reports typically splits 
interventions into reported and secret interventions and analyzes the significance of the coefficients 
for the volume of each type of intervention (Dominguez, 1998; Beine et al., 2002). This paper 
analyzes the efficency of interventions using intercept dummies that represent reported and secret 
interventions, while controlling for intervention volume. Although market traders do not know the 
exact intervention volumes on intervention days, they can guess the approximate sizes based on 
market rumors and trading activity, especially when large-scale interventions are carried out. This 
contradicts the view of shifting slopes because the difference between announced and unannounced 
interventions lessens as intervention volume increases. We pre-test the model incorporating both slope 
and intercept dummies and find that using intercept dummies is preferable to shifting slopes. 
 19 
 
14  The overnight market rates are the Federal Funds rate for the U.S. and the call rate for Japan.  20 
 
A potential caveat of our regressions is that interventions may be endogenous. Kearns 
and Rigobon (2004) suggest an empirical methodology for taking this endogeneity into account 
by directly modeling the potential behavior and reaction of central banks. It is well known, 
however, that specifying the determinants of interventions is not an easy task. Most studies on the 
reaction functions of central bank interventions use either a binary choice approach or a nested 
logit model and do not fully specify intervention volume (Ito and Yabu, 2007; Beine et al., 
2009b). There is a risk, therefore, of misspecification when specifying a parametric model of 
intervention behavior that corrects for the endogeneity bias. Moreover, as suggested by Fratzscher 
(2006), the literature, including Sarno and Taylor (2001), has shown that actual interventions tend 
to be of the leaning-against-the-wind type, i.e. they usually go against the previous exchange rate 
trend. Therefore, if endogeneity generates a bias, it will be a downward bias, and the true effect of 
interventions may be even larger. 
 
5.  Estimation  results 
5.1. Linear estimation of announcement effects 
We first examine whether officially announced interventions have a larger effect on 
exchange rates than secret interventions and unannounced but reported interventions. Table 2 
presents the results of the GARCH estimations for the full sample period as well as the four 
subsample periods distinguished by Vice Ministers of Finance for International Affairs of MOF. 
In the results of the mean equation for the full sample period, the coefficient of the Japanese 
announced interventions dummy is significantly positive, while those of the Japanese 
unannounced but reported interventions dummy and the secret interventions dummy are 
significantly negative, suggesting that announced interventions are not just effective but 
significantly more effective than non-announcement interventions. The negative signs of the 
non-announcement interventions do not necessarily imply that interventions without official 
announcements inversely affect the return of exchange rate. Taking into account the volume 
effect, such strategies can be effective although their efficiency is significantly less than that of 
announced interventions.   
During the full sample period, whenever the U.S. authorities intervened, the Japanese 
authorities intervened on the same day. As there were no unilateral U.S. interventions, but were 
many unilateral Japanese interventions, the U.S. intervention dummies with and without official 
announcements capture the impacts of coordinated interventions between the U.S. and Japan. On  21 
 
the other hand, the Japanese intervention dummies represent the Japanese unilateral intervention 
effect because we take into account the effect of coordinated interventions. 
Both announced and unannounced but reported U.S. interventions are significantly 
effective, conditional on the volume of the intervention. On the other hand, the intervention 
volume does not affect exchange rates if we control for the intervention dummies. With regard to 
coordinated interventions, it is whether the intervention is announced and/or reported that has a 
significant influence on exchange rates, not the volume of the intervention. 
Table 2 also presents the regression results for the four sub-sample periods. Interestingly, 
the coefficient of the dummy for secret interventions is significantly negative in period 1, while 
that of the dummy for announcement is significantly positive in period 2. This sharp contrast 
suggests that Dr. Sakakibara’s policy change in favor of official announcements might lead to 
more successful interventions. However, the evidence that the intervention announcement is 
effective only in period 2 and not in other sub-sample periods may question previous studies 
which show that official announcements have unambiguous effects (Fratzscher, 2006; Beine et al., 
2009a).  
The results from the volatility equation are also striking. In the full sample, neither the 
Japanese intervention volume nor its announced intervention dummy is significant. Moreover, the 
unannounced but reported intervention dummy is significantly negative. Together with the results 
from the mean equation, this evidence suggests that Japanese interventions are quite effective in 
stabilizing the market as well as affecting the level of exchange rate in the desired direction. 
However, the four sub-sample regressions show that announced interventions are volatility 
enhancing in periods 2 and 3, while unannounced interventions contribute to lower volatility in 
periods 1 and 4. One may conclude that the difference in intervention policies may lead to the 
difference in outcome. Specifically, if the central bank aims to alter the previous exchange rate 
trend, i.e., the leaning-against-the-wind policy, announced interventions are appropriate although 
they are accompanied by an increase in volatility. On the other hand, if stabilizing exchange rate 
movements is the primary objective, the central bank should choose secret interventions even if 
they may have little effect on the exchange rate level. 
A careful comparison between periods 2 and 3, however, allows us to find that this is not 
always true. Although Mr. Kuroda followed Dr. Sakakibara’s announcement strategy, his 
interventions are not effective in period 3. This implies that official announcements alone do not 
necessarily guarantee the success of interventions. 
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5.2. Non-linear estimation of announcement effects 
We then investigate whether the effectiveness of announcements hinges on market 
conditions just before the intervention takes place. Specifically, we test whether the 
announcements on interventions have a stronger impact when traders have inaccurate information 
and the exchange rate misalignment is therefore large. We use the implied volatility derived from 
at-the-money option prices (one- and three-month) on the spot yen/dollar rates as a proxy for the 
above two variables as they are positively related as shown in our model. 
Tables 3 reports the results of the GARCH model in which we introduce the interaction 
repressor: the product of the intervention dummy and the implied volatility (one- and 
three-month) of the exchange rate. To prevent a simultaneity problem, the interaction terms 
consist of the one period lagged values of implied volatility. Since implied volatility is highly 
persistent, the one period lag is a proxy for the implied volatility just before an intervention. The 
results of volatility equation are omitted for the sake of space because the interaction terms are 
not significant. 
In the first column of Table 3 (results for the whole sample period), the result of the 
estimation with one-month and three-month implied volatility is displayed. The coefficient of the 
interaction term between the Japanese announcement dummy and the lagged implied volatility is 
significantly positive, while that of the Japanese announced dummy is significantly negative. This 
suggests that announcement effects have a non-linear relationship with exchange rate changes, 
which depend on the implied volatility of the previous business day. Based on these coefficients, 
we infer that official announcements influence exchange rates in the desired direction if the 
lagged implied volatility is greater than 11.38% for 1 month maturity and 11.32% for 3 month 
maturity, respectively. Furthermore, the significantly positive coefficient of the interaction term 
between the Japanese intervention volume and lagged implied volatility shows that large-scale 
interventions are effective when lagged implied volatility is sufficiently high (more than 3.78% 
for 1 month and 3.60% for 3 month, respectively). In contrast, keeping interventions secret (both 
the unannounced but reported interventions and the secret interventions) has no significant impact 
on the exchange rates themselves. The results for period 2 show that lagged implied volatility of 
more than 10.43% for 1 month and 11.30% for 3 month, respectively, are required for announced 
interventions to be effective. When implied volatility on the last trading day is sufficiently high, 
the effect of official announcements on exchange rate is significant. 
Table 4 also shows a similar non-linearity effect for announcements on current implied 
volatility depending on lagged implied volatility. The result for the whole sample period suggests  23 
 
that when lagged implied volatility is more than 13.99% for 1 month, official announcements can 
reduce current implied volatility because the interaction term has a negative coefficient and the 
announced intervention dummy is positively signed. However, the coefficient of the interaction 
term between intervention volume and lagged implied volatility is significantly positive, 
mitigating the effect on volatility. We then need to consider both volume effect and 
announcement effect simultaneously. For example, suppose the intervention volume is 200 billion 
yen (the average for the whole sample period). We find that a lagged implied volatility of more 
than 15.24% is needed for an announced intervention to reduce the volatility of exchange rates. 
This indicates that lagged implied volatility, serving as a proxy for information inaccuracy and 
the degree of an exchange rate misalignment, is an important determinant of the efficiency of 
announcements and interventions on both the level and expected volatility of exchange rates. 
Figure 4 displays the movements of 1 month and 3 month implied volatilities and suggests that 
Mr. Yen conducted announced interventions when the implied volatility was high, especially in 
the summer of 1995 and in April and June of 1998.   
 
6.  Conclusion 
This paper contributes to the existing literature on foreign exchange interventions. First, 
we present an alternative channel for exchange rate interventions under which announcements by 
the central bank can make the exchange rate more efficient through an improvement in traders’ 
information about the exchange rate’s fundamental value, even when the information disclosed 
by the central bank is inferior to that of traders. Second, this model provides the testable 
implication that announced interventions are more effective in periods of high implied volatility 
because the degree of information inaccuracy and the exchange rate misalignment is positively 
correlated with implied volatility. This prediction is borne out empirically in our findings based 
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A.  Proof of PROPOSITION 1 
We first derive a rational expectations equilibrium with finite traders and show that the 
equilibrium price function converges to (6). By applying the projection theorem, we derive the 
distribution of y conditional on (si, p) which is normal with mean 
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where the variance and covariance with regards to p are derived from the conjectural exchange 
rate function. Since the conditional variance is constant and common for all traders, we omit 
indicator i for the conditional variance hereafter. 
y Esi = By definition, . Putting the demand function into the market clearing condition and 
taking the unconditional expectation, we have y Ep = . The market clearing condition can be 
solved for p as follows: 
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We can solve the closed form solution for the simultaneous equations by taking the ratio of βs 
and βx. A careful calculation obtains the following equation: 
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Consider this as a cubic equation of k ≡ βs/βx. By applying the Cardano formula for a cubic 
equation, we can find the unique solution as an explicit function of exogenous parameters.   
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Using k, the equilibrium coefficients are solved explicitly. 
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  Now we show the convergence of this equilibrium exchange rate function to (6). Since {εi} are 
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B.  Proof of inequality (10) 
From the equilibrium function, the variance is given as a function of underlying parameters: 
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Thus, we have dvar[p−y]/dσε
2  
[] 0 2 6 ) 1 2 ( 4 ) 2 ( 4




> + + + + + = ε ε ε ε σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ
σ σ
y y x y x y x y x y x





C.  Proof of PROPOSITION 2 
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The coefficient αs is given in (7). We have   
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The sign of the derivative is determined by the sign of the term in parenthesis in (A17), which 
is a concave quadratic function with one positive and one negative intersections. Note σε
2 > 0. 
Then we can conclude that derivative (A17) is positive as long as σε
2 is less than the positive 
intersection. The condition is 
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The boundary is strictly larger than σy
2. This completes the proof for PROPOSITION 2. 
QED 
 
D.  Procedure for numerical exercises on Figure 1 and Figure 2 
As we derived for the pre-announcement equilibrium price function in section 2.2, the post 
announcement price function is derived as a fixed point of the correspondence from an affine 
price function in the form of equation (20) to another price function satisfying the market clearing 
condition, 
x y y y p x B B y γ ε γ γ + + − + = ′ ) (  (20)  . 
The rational traders use this price function and other information to derive the net demand 
function for the foreign currency. Investor i has four information signals si,  sB,  p,  p', so the 
demand function is   
.
] , , , | var[
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    Before deriving conditional expectations, we should note the following fact. 
 
Fact: Price function p' in (20) is a linear combination of sB and price function p in (6), and 
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 therefore either p or p' is redundant for rational investors. 
 
Otherwise rational investors can solve three linear equations (6), (17), and (20) and pin down 
three unknown variables (y, εB, x), and therefore the price after the announcement p' must become 
y. Of course, the announcement of the imperfect signal, sB, cannot clear the informational 
inefficiency perfectly. We have checked the redundancy for the numerically derived price 
functions although we use the fact without proof. 
  This fact allows us to ignore the pre-announcement price, p, to calculate the conditional 
expectations as given by 
] , , | [ ] , , , | [ p s s y E p p s s y E B i B i ′ = ′ ,
  ] , , | var[ ] , , , | var[ p s s y p p s s y B i B i ′ = ′ . 
    Still the conditional expectations have three signals as conditions. To simplify the calculations, 
we introduce the sufficient statistic of the first two signals, si and s B. Let wi be the sufficient 
statistic, then it is given as 
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τs and  τB are the precision of the signals, showing how reliable the signals are. Being the 
sufficient statistic implies the following equivalences: 
] , | [ ] , , | [ p w y E p s s y E i B i ′ = ′ ,
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That is, in order to derive the conditional expectations it is sufficient to know wi, and the 
weighted averages of si and sB. You do not need each value of si and sB. It is worth noting that the 
weights of si and s B are their precisions. A more precise signal has a greater impact on the 
conditional expectations.
    Now conditional expectations have just two signals as conditions, and we can apply the 
projection theorem that we used in the proof of proposition 1. Thus, we have 





























var ) , cov(
) , cov( var
) , cov( ) , cov(
    
) ( ) ( p E p Ew w y p i i w ′ − ′ + − + = ′ λ λ   
  ] , | var[ ] , , , | var[ p w y p p s s y i B i ′ = ′
 
  .


















var ) , cov(
) , cov( var












The expected values, variances, and co-variances are   











 2 2 2 2 2 2 var x x B B y y p σ γ σ γ σ γ + + = ′ , 
B i
B






2 ) , cov( , 
2 ) , cov( y i w y σ = , and 
2 ) , cov( y y p y σ γ = ′ . 
Putting these into the demand function, we get the demand function as a linear function of wi 
and p'. Substituting the linear demand function into the market clearing condition and take the 
limit of n going to infinity, we have another price function in the form of equation (20). 
  The rational expectations equilibrium requires that the derived price function be equivalent to 
the original price function (20). Since the price function is specified by the confidents (γy, γB, γx), 
we need to find the fixed point of the correspondence from the coefficients of equation (20) to the 
coefficients of the derived price function.   
  Since it is too difficult to derive the fixed point coefficients analytically, we use a simple 
numerical procedure. In the numerical procedure to find the fixed point, we have to give values of 
parameters. For given parameter values, we start from an arbitrary set of positive coefficients (γy0, 
γB0, γx0), and then derive the coefficients (γy1, γB1, γx1) of the market clearing price function. If (γy1, 
γB1, γx1) are incidentally equal to (γy0, γB0, γx0), this is the set of parameters we are looking for. If 
not, we feed back the derived coefficients (γy1, γB1, γx1) as an input of the correspondence, and 
derive new coefficients (γy2, γB2, γx2). If (γy2, γB2, γx2) are incidentally equal to (γy1, γB1, γx1), this is 
the set of parameters we are looking for. If not, we repeat the process until we reach to the fixed 
correspondence. 
    In Fig. 1, we fix four parameters as σy2 = 5, σε
2 = 3, σx
2 = 5, a=1 and take different values for θ. 
For each value of θ, we first derive the equilibrium price function. Then, using that function we 
calculate 
2 2 * 2 2 * 2 2 *) 1 ( ] var[ x x B y y y p σ γ θσ γ σ γ ε + + − = − ′  
for each value of θ.  
  In Fig. 2, we fix three parameters as σy
2 = 5, σx
2 = 5, a=1, and give different values for θ and 
σε
2. For each pair of θ and σε
2, we first derive the equilibrium price function. Then, using that 
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when M is large. 
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＜Full sample period ： 3430 days＞
5/13/1991-7/2/2004 343 44 164 135 22 11 11 0
12.8% 47.8% 39.4% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0%
Average volume of interventions per day
(unit: 100 million yen for JP int. and 1million
dollars for US int.)
1991 4225 1735 1573 358 398 318 0
＜Period 1 ： 1072 days＞
5/13/1991-6/20/1995 165 10 118 37 18 7 11 0
6.1% 71.5% 22.4% 38.9% 61.1% 0.0%
Average volume of interventions per day
(unit: 100 million yen for JP int. and 1million
dollars for US int.)
470 642 514 281 328 344 318 0
＜Period 2 ： 1056 days＞
6/21/1995-7/7/1999 24 8 14 2 4 4 0 0
33.3% 58.3% 8.3% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Average volume of interventions per day
(unit: 100 million yen for JP int. and 1million
dollars for US int.)
5105 4598 6025 683 492 492 0 0
＜Period 3 ： 918 days＞
7/8/1999-1/13/2003 25 25 0 0 0 0 0 0
100.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Average volume of interventions per day
(unit: 100 million yen for JP int. and 1million
dollars for US int.)
5282 5282 0 0 0 0 0 0
＜Period 4 ： 384 days＞
1/14/2003-7/2/2004 129 1 32 96 0 0 0 0
0.8% 24.8% 74.4%
Average volume of interventions per day
(unit: 100 million yen for JP int. and 1million
dollars for US int.)
2719 10667 4359 2090 0 0 0 0
Note. The US interventions during the sample period were all coordinated with the Japan.
Period
JP Interventions
Source: The Ministry of Finance of Japan, Quarterly Review of Federal Reserve Bank of NY, Bloomberg and Reuters.
US Interventions
 
33 Table 2. GARCH estimation with intervention dummies 
Mean Equation
Constant -0.036 ** -0.036 * -0.201 -0.039 -0.332
(0.016) (0.021) (0.299) (0.049) (0.254)
Interest rate differential -0.011 *** -0.012 -0.051 -0.009 -0.266
(0.004) (0.010) (0.061) (0.011) (0.231)
JP intervention volume 0.059 *** -0.363 *** 0.084 * 0.057 0.030 ***
(0.011) (0.080) (0.045) (0.035) (0.011)
US intervention volume 0.404 -1.081 ** 4.221 - -
(0.566) (0.491) (5.784) - -
JP announced 0.185 * 0.914 0.803 ** 0.023 0.174
   intervention dummy (0.099) (0.584) (0.351) (0.237) (3.894)
JP unannounced but  -0.201 *** -0.103 ** -0.246 - -0.015
   reported int. dummy (0.051) (0.042) (0.302) - (0.114)
JP secret intervention -0.149 ** -0.037 0.382 - -0.094
   dummy (0.062) (0.115) (0.511) - (0.063)
US announced 0.717 ** -0.249 0.038 - -
   intervention dummy (0.340) (0.703) (2.102) - -
US unannounced but 0.751 *** 1.214 *** --
   reported int. dummy (0.197) (0.166) - - -
Variance Equation
Constant 0.006 ** 0.258 *** 0.339 *** 0.435 ** 0.088 ***
(0.003) (0.040) (0.034) (0.195) (0.031)
Arch(-1) 0.032 *** 0.007 ** 0.059 *** 0.008 *** 0.181 ***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.051)
Garch (-1) 0.953 *** 0.983 *** 0.939 *** 0.912 *** 0.574 ***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.100)
Holiday 0.007 0.003 *** 0.014 *** 0.001 0.039
(0.009) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.035)
JP intervention volume 0.001 0.021 -0.031 ** -0.021 *** -0.011 ***
(0.002) (0.014) (0.013) (0.006) (0.004)
US intervention volume 0.346 * 0.373 *** -0.354 - -
(0.198) (0.090) (1.230) - -
JP announced -0.017 -0.130 0.471 * 0.104 *** -0.045
   intervention dummy (0.016) (0.112) (0.260) (0.031) (0.947)
JP unannounced but  -0.034 *** -0.031 *** 0.056 - 0.088
   reported int. dummy (0.006) (0.007) (0.048) - (0.062)
JP secret intervention 0.004 0.014 -0.110 *** - -0.049 **
   dummy (0.005) (0.012) (0.023) - (0.021)
US announced 0.044 0.137 0.078 - -
   intervention dummy (0.084) (0.156) (0.558) - -
US unannounced but 0.286 *** -0.015 - - -
   reported int. dummy (0.079) (0.038) - - -
Obs. 3430 1072 1056 918 384













Standard errors are in parenthesis.  *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. There were no US interventions in Periods 3 and 4. The 
scales are 100 million yen for JP interventions and 1 million dollars for US interventions. 
34 Table 3. GARCH estimation with intervention dummies and implied volatility 
Mean Equation
Constant -0.025 -0.253 ** -0.190 -0.014 -0.321
(0.050) (0.122) (0.308) (0.110) (0.358)
Interest rate differential -0.010 ** 0.001 -0.060 -0.008 -0.330
(0.005) (0.012) (0.061) (0.012) (0.234)
JP intervention volume -0.034 0.048 -0.116 -0.146 -0.083
(0.052) (0.576) (0.345) (0.346) (0.233)
US intervention volume -0.112 -0.755 -1.036 - -
(0.428) (0.523) (5.025) - -
JP announced -1.570 *** -1.595 -5.185 ** 0.621 -0.185
   intervention dummy (0.510) (2.911) (2.298) (2.196) (5220)
JP unannounced but  -0.089 -0.145 -1.263 - 0.649
   reported int. dummy (0.219) (0.359) (2.285) - (1.023)
JP secret intervention -0.006 0.134 -8.884 - 0.372
   dummy (0.369) (0.684) (148.348) - (0.707)
US announced 0.968 *** 0.067 2.212 - -
   intervention dummy (0.263) (1.281) (1.782) - -
US unannounced but 0.946 *** 1.294 *** --
   reported int. dummy (0.138) (0.161) - - -
IV(-1, 1m) 0.000 0.024 * -0.004 -0.002 -0.009
(0.005) (0.013) (0.006) (0.011) (0.024)
JP int. volume × 0.009 ** -0.032 0.016 0.016 0.014
   IV(-1, 1m) (0.005) (0.043) (0.027) (0.028) (0.025)
JP announced int. × 0.138 *** 0.168 0.497 *** -0.042 -
   IV(-1, 1m) (0.040) (0.208) (0.170) (0.176) -
JP unannounced int. × -0.014 -0.003 0.081 - -0.078
   IV(-1, 1m) (0.019) (0.029) (0.170) - (0.113)
JP secret int. × -0.015 -0.021 0.708 - -0.054
   IV(-1, 1m) (0.039) (0.064) (11.136) - (0.076)
Obs. 3429 1071 1056 918 384
Log likelihood -3467.9 -1058.1 -1149.57 -897.937 -312.375
Mean Equation
Constant -0.038 -0.487 ** -0.097 -0.036 -0.325
(0.061) (0.190) (0.318) (0.141) (0.443)
Interest rate differential -0.010 * 0.011 -0.045 -0.006 -0.336
(0.005) (0.013) (0.062) (0.013) (0.235)
JP intervention volume -0.036 -0.224 0.226 -0.196 -0.114
(0.061) (0.751) (0.526) (0.350) (0.313)
US intervention volume -0.178 -0.707 -0.070 - -
(0.419) (0.497) (15.587) - -
JP announced -2.355 *** -2.187 -7.808 ** 0.502 -0.069
   intervention dummy (0.593) (3.716) (3.480) (2.318) (15925.990)
JP unannounced but  -0.010 0.126 -4.814 - 1.141
   reported int. dummy (0.296) (0.499) (3.938) - (1.482)
JP secret intervention -0.015 0.468 -7.550 - 0.631
   dummy (0.423) (0.979) (95.031) - (1.006)
US announced 0.893 *** 0.076 1.521 - -
   intervention dummy (0.268) (1.299) (4.974) - -
US unannounced but 0.968 *** 1.302 *** --
   reported int. dummy (0.137) (0.159) - - -
IV(-1, 3m) 0.001 0.047 ** -0.005 0.001 -0.009
(0.006) (0.019) (0.007) (0.015) (0.036)
JP int. volume × 0.010 * -0.012 -0.011 0.020 0.017
   IV(-1, 3m) (0.006) (0.059) (0.041) (0.029) (0.034)
JP announced int. × 0.208 *** 0.217 0.691 *** -0.032 -
   IV(-1, 3m) (0.048) (0.279) (0.260) (0.193) -
JP unannounced int. × -0.021 -0.027 0.596 - -0.130
   IV(-1, 3m) (0.027) (0.042) (7.046) - (0.167)
JP secret int. × -0.014 -0.053 0.000 - -0.082
   IV(-1, 3m) (0.044) (0.091) (0.000) - (0.109)
Obs. 3429 1071 1056 918 384
























35 Standard errors are in parenthesis.  *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. There were no US interventions in Periods 3 and 4. The 
scales are 100 million yen for JP interventions and 1 million dollars for US interventions. 
The implied volatility is calculated from the yen/dollar option price (at the money). 
36 Table 4. Implied volatility estimation with intervention dummies 
% change in IV(1m)
Constant 1.597 *** 2.726 *** 1.506 3.415 *** 5.399
(0.587) (0.891) (1.029) (1.020) (3.304)
IV(-1, 1m) -0.196 *** -0.349 *** 1.120 *** -0.361 *** -0.616 *
(0.054) (0.089) (0.406) (0.096) (0.344)
Holiday 1.704 *** 2.109 *** 1.120 *** 1.598 *** 2.436 ***
(0.220) (0.434) (0.406) (0.348) (0.668)
JP intervention volume -1.224 ** 19.277 ** -1.075 1.836 -0.637
(0.530) (7.870) (2.356) (2.019) (1.465)
US intervention volume -5.274 -8.062 -23.428 - -
   (-1) (7.599) (7.069) (20.235) - -
JP announced 18.282 *** 10.284 15.700 -1.284 7.667 **
   intervention dummy (6.020) (9.785) (13.302) (12.546) (3.474)
JP unannounced but  6.207 ** -2.421 12.690 - 0.381
   reported int. dummy (2.497) (4.575) (14.053) - (7.621)
JP secret intervention 1.792 -1.519 19.770 *** - 4.333
   dummy (2.134) (3.958) (2.578) - (5.600)
US announced 7.572 4.119 24.375 * --
   intervention dummy (4.951) (3.224) (13.173) - -
US unannounced but 7.782 * 6.950 * --
   reported int. dummy (4.104) (3.963) - - -
JP int. volume × 0.134 *** -1.207 ** 0.111 -0.057 0.075
   IV(-1, 1m) (0.047) (0.581) (0.180) (0.161) (0.153)
JP announced int. × -1.307 *** -0.745 -1.172 0.035 -
   IV(-1, 1m) (0.479) (0.824) (0.922) (1.009) -
JP unannounced int. × -0.437 ** 0.203 -0.825 - -0.024
   IV(-1, 1m) (0.214) (0.367) (1.117) - (0.764)
JP secret int. × -0.209 0.094 -1.196 *** - -0.571
   IV(-1, 1m) (0.210) (0.333) (0.200) - (0.601)
Obs. 3429 1071 1056 918 384
Adj. R
2 0.058 0.087 0.046 0.087 0.085
Constant 0.961 ** 1.827 *** 0.952 2.366 *** 5.030 *
(0.388) (0.708) (0.687) (0.777) (2.588)
IV(-1, 3m) -0.106 *** -0.213 *** -0.089 -0.229 *** -0.547 **
(0.035) (0.070) (0.055) (0.072) (0.275)
Holiday 0.609 *** 0.979 *** 0.381 0.431 * 0.647
(0.136) (0.238) (0.262) (0.245) (0.405)
JP intervention volume -0.792 ** 12.435 * -1.962 0.201 -0.459
(0.372) (6.532) (1.653) (0.878) (1.450)
US intervention volume -3.515 -4.764 -15.780 - -
   (-1) (3.913) (3.188) (14.462) - -
JP announced 8.993 ** 7.519 20.546 * -3.272 5.576 **
   intervention dummy (4.378) (7.794) (11.450) (8.173) (2.382)
JP unannounced but  3.305 * -2.316 15.040 - -0.602
   reported int. dummy (1.749) (3.431) (9.861) - (7.314)
JP secret intervention 1.135 -1.476 6.065 *** - 2.671
   dummy (1.730) (3.302) (1.782) - (4.478)
US announced 4.298 1.975 15.169 - -
   int. dummy (-1) (2.947) (1.580) (9.866) - -
US unannounced but 3.838 * 3.321 * --
   reported int. dum. (-1) (2.028) (1.739) - - -
JP int. volume × 0.082 ** -0.849 0.158 0.027 0.050
   IV(-1, 3m) (0.033) (0.522) (0.125) (0.065) (0.157)
JP announced int. × -0.629 * -0.572 -1.548 * 0.313 -
   IV(-1, 3m) (0.367) (0.677) (0.811) (0.645) -
JP unannounced int. × -0.228 0.206 -1.043 - 0.077
   IV(-1, 3m) (0.156) (0.289) (0.775) - (0.783)
JP secret int. × -0.124 0.088 -0.276 ** - -0.330
   IV(-1, 3m) (0.176) (0.302) (0.136) - (0.484)
Obs. 3429 1071 1056 918 384
























Adj. R 0.065   
37 Standard errors are in parenthesis.  *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%、
5% and 1% levels, respectively. There were no US interventions in Periods 3 and 4. The 
scales are 100 million yen for JP interventions and million dollars for US interventions. The 
implied volatility is calculated from the yen/dollar option price (at the money). 
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The graph is drawn for the following parameters. σy
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Figure 4. Implied volatility 